Mr. Friedman underscored problems of asymmetry in regulation: People who especially benefit frombr a particular regulation will be inclined to lobby or bribe government officials for it.br Mr. Coolidge generally opposed government intervention in the economy on libertarian grounds,br and some of his policies have a certain resonance in the Trump era: After all, Coolidge cut taxes on high-income people; appointed a very wealthy man, Andrew Mellon, as Treasury secretary; and restricted immigration by region of origin.br I can personally attest to the emotional side of the argument, since I see it reflected in my own extended family, where the Trump supporters tend to have strong business connectionsbr and seem to take regulation as a personal affront, as if it stands as a barrier to their self-actualization and personal fulfillment.br On Jan. 30 he ordered that for every new regulation it imposes, the government must get rid of two old ones.br Putting emotions aside for a moment, there is indeed a problem — one recognized by both major politicalbr parties for decades — involving the need for incentives to get the level and tone of regulation right.br Assuming a reflexive pro-business bias — assuming that businessmen can do no wrong andbr that regulations can be pared back mechanically — is inconsistent with making difficult judgments about subtle deceptions.br Coolidge, for example, spoke reassuringly about the burgeoning brokers’ loansbr that helped to fuel the stock market boom in the 1920s, and said that America’s business outlook was tremendous, building public confidence — until the crash came, and confidence collapsed.